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David C. Parkes
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions allow bidders to express complex valuations on bundles of
items, and have been proposed in settings as diverse as the allocation of ﬂoor
space in a new condominium building to individual units (Wired 2000) and the
allocation of take-off and landing slots at airports (Smith, Forward). Many
applications are described in Part V of this book.
The promise of combinatorial auctions (CAs) is that they can allow bidders to
better express their private information about preferences for different outcomes
and thus enhance competition and market efﬁciency. Much effort has been spent
on developing algorithms for the hard problem of winner determination once bids
have been received (Sandholm, Chapter 14). Yet, preference elicitation has
emerged as perhaps the key bottleneck in the real-world deployment of
combinatorial auctions. Advanced clearing algorithms are worthless if one cannot
simplify the bidding problem facing bidders.
Preference elicitation is a problem both because of the communication cost of
sending bids to the auction and also because of the cost on bidders to determine
their valuations for different bundles. The problem of communication complexity
can be addressed through the design of careful bidding languages, that provide
expressive but concise bids (Nisan Chapter 9). Non-computational approaches
can also be useful, such as deﬁning the good and bundle space in the right way in
the ﬁrst place (Pekeˇ c and Rothkopf Chapter 16).
However, even well-designed sealed-bid auctions cannot address the problem of
hard valuation problems because they preclude the use of feedback and price
1discovery to focus bidder attention. There are an exponential number of bundles
to value in CAs. Moreover, the problem of valuing even a single bundle can be
difﬁcult in many applications of CA technology. For instance, in the airport
landing slot scenario (see Ball, Donohue and Hoffman Chapter 20) we should
imagine that airlines are solving local scheduling, marketing, and
revenue-management problems to determine their values for different
combinations of slots.
Iterative combinatorial auctions are designed to address the problem of costly
preference elicitation that arises due to hard valuation problems. An iterative CA
allows bidders to submit multiple bids during an auction and provides information
feedback to support adaptive and focused elicitation. For example, an ascending
price auction maintains ask prices and allows bidders to revise bids as prices are
discovered. Signiﬁcantly, it is often possible to determine an efﬁcient allocation
without bidders reporting, or even determining, exact values for all bundles. In
contrast, any efﬁcient sealed-bid auction requires bidders to report and determine
their value for all feasible bundles of goods.
This ability to mitigate the preference elicitation problem is a central concern in
iterative CA design. But there are also a number of less tangible yet still important
beneﬁts:
• Iterative CAs can help to distribute the computation in an auction across
bidders through the interactive involvement of bidders in guiding the
dynamics of the auction. Some formal models show the equivalence
between iterative CAs and decentralized optimization algorithms (Parkes
and Ungar 2000a, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra 2003). Iterative CAs can
address concerns about privacy because bidders only need to reveal partial
and indirect information about their valuations.1
• Transparency is another practical concern in CAs. In the high-stakes world
of wireless spectrum auctions, the Federal Communications Commission
2(FCC) has been especially keen to ensure that bidders can verify and
validate the outcome of an auction. Although mathematically elegant, the
VCG outcome can be difﬁcult to explain to bidders, and validation requires
the disclosure and veriﬁcation of many bids, both losing and winning. Thus,
even as readily describable implementations of sealed-bid auctions, iterative
CAs can offer some appeal (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002).
• The dynamic exchange of value information between bidders, that is
enabled within iterative CAs, is known to enhance revenue and efﬁciency in
single item auctions with correlated values (Milgrom and Weber 1982).
Although little is known about the design of iterative CAs for correlated
value problems, one should expect iterative CAs to retain this beneﬁt over
their sealed-bid counterparts. Certainly, correlated value settings exist:
consider the wireless spectrum auctions in which valuations are in part
driven by underlying population demographics and shared technological
realities.
Yet, even with all these potential advantages iterative CAs offer new opportunities
to bidders for manipulation. The biggest challenge in iterative CA design is to
support incremental and focused bidding without allowing new strategic behavior
to compromise the economic goals of efﬁciency or optimality. For instance, one
useful design paradigm seeks to implement auctions in which straightforward
bidding (truthful demand revelation in response to prices) is an ex post
equilibrium. This equilibrium is invariant to the private information of bidders, so
that straightforward bidding is a best response whatever the valuations of other
bidders.
Steps can also be taken to minimize opportunities for signaling through careful
control of the information that can be shared between bidders during an auction.
Finally, the beneﬁts of iterative auctions disappear when bidders choose to
strategically delay bidding activity until the last rounds of an auction. Activity
3rules (Milgrom 2000) can be used to address this stalling and promote meaningful
bidding during the early rounds of an auction.
The existing literature on iterative CAs largely focuses on the design of efﬁcient
auctions. Indeed, there are no known optimal (i.e. revenue-maximizing)
general-purpose CAs, iterative or otherwise. As such, the canonical VCG
mechanism (see Chapter 1) has guided the design of many iterative auctions.2
We focus mainly on price-based approaches, in which the auctioneer provides ask
prices to coordinate the bidding process. We also consider alternative paradigms,
including decentralized protocols, proxied auctions in which a bidding agent
elicits preference information and automatically bids using a predetermined
procedure, and direct-elicitation approaches.
In outline, Section 2 deﬁnes competitive equilibrium (CE) prices for CAs, which
may be non-linear and non-anonymous in general. Connections between CE
prices, the core of the coalitional game, and the VCG outcome are explained.
Section 3 describes the design space of iterative CAs. Section 4 discusses
price-based auctions, providing a survey of existing price-based CAs in the
literature and a detailed case study of an efﬁcient ascending price auction. Section
5 considers some alternatives to price-based design. Section 6 closes with a brief
discussion of some of the open problems in the design of iterative combinatorial
auctions, and draws some connections with the rest of this book.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = {1,...,m} denote the set of items, and assume a private values model
with vi(S) ≥ 0 to denote the value of bidder i ∈ I = {1,...,n} for bundle
S ⊆ G. Note that set I does not include the seller. We assume free-disposal, with
vi(T) ≥ vi(S) for all T ⊇ S, and normalization, with vi(∅) = 0. Let V denote the
set of bidder valuations. Bidders are assumed to have quasi-linear utility (we also
use payoff interchangeably with utility), with utility ui(S,p) = vi(S) − p for
bundle S at price p ≥ 0. This assumes the absence of any budget constraints.
4Further assume that the seller has no intrinsic value for the items.
The efﬁcient combinatorial allocation problem (CAP) solves:
max
S=(S1,...,Sn)
X
i∈I
vi(Si) [CAP(I)]
s.t. Si ∩ Sj = ∅, ∀i,j
Let S∗ denote the efﬁcient allocation. Also, we write CAP(I \ i) to denote the
combinatorial allocation problem without bidder i.
2.1 Competitive Equilibrium Prices
We can consider a hierarchical structure for ask prices in CAs:
Linear. Prices pj ≥ 0, for j ∈ G, deﬁne additive prices on bundles, with
p(S) =
P
j∈S pj.
Non-linear. Prices, p(S) ≥ 0, for S ⊆ G, allow p(S)  = p(S1) + p(S2), for some
S = S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Non-linear and Non-anonymous. Prices pi(S) ≥ 0, allow discriminatory
pricing, with pi(S)  = pi′(S) for bidder i  = i′, in addition to non-linear
prices.
In the following deﬁnitions we adopt pi(S) for notational convenience. We intend
to allow (but not require) with this notation non-linear and non-anonymous prices.
For instance, linear prices pj can be considered to induce prices pi(S) =
P
j∈S pj
for bundle S and bidder i.
Competitive equilibrium prices extend the concept of Walrasian equilibrium
prices to a CA. Let πi(S,p) = vi(S) − pi(S) denote bidder i’s payoff from
bundle S at prices p and Πs(S,p) =
P
i∈I pi(Si) denote the seller’s revenue from
allocation S at prices p.
5Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium). Prices, p, and allocation
S∗ = (S∗
1,...,S∗
n) are in competitive equilibrium (CE) if:
πi(S∗
i ,p) = max
S⊆G
[vi(S) − pi(S),0] ∀i (1)
Πs(S∗,p) = max
S∈Γ
X
i∈I
pi(Si) (2)
where Γ denotes the set of all feasible allocations.
A competitive equilibrium (p,S∗) is such that allocation S∗ maximizes the payoff
of every bidder and the seller given prices. Allocation S∗ is said to be supported
by prices p in CE.
Theorem 1. Allocation S∗ is supported in competitive equilibrium if and only if
S∗ is an efﬁcient allocation.
This welfare theorem follows from a simple linear-programming (LP) duality
argument for suitably extended LP formulations of the CAP (Bikhchandani and
Ostroy 2002, also Chapter 8). Moreover, CE prices always exist for the CAP. For
instance, prices pi = vi trivially satisfy the CE conditions. The main new element
in CAs is that these CE prices must sometimes be non-linear and non-anonymous.
Bikhchandani and Ostroy also show an equivalence between the core of the
coalitional game and the set of CE prices. All core outcomes can be priced, and
all CE prices correspond to core payoffs.
Many iterative CAs are designed to converge to CE prices, and as such it is
important to characterize classes of valuations for which linear, and non-linear but
anonymous, CE prices exist. We will also see that it is necessary that an efﬁcient
CA must determine enough information about bidder valuations to deﬁne a set of
CE prices, and necessary that a Vickrey auction determines enough information to
deﬁne a set of universal CE prices.
For the existence of linear CE prices, it is sufﬁcient (and almost necessary)3 that
valuations satisfy a goods are substitutes property (Kelso and Crawford 1982, Gul
6and Stacchetti 1999). This substitutes condition is deﬁned indirectly, with respect
to a demand set:
Di(p) = {S : πi(S,p) ≥ max
T⊆G
πi(T,p),πi(S,p) ≥ 0,S ⊆ G}, (3)
which includes all bundles that maximize a bidder’s payoff at the prices.
Deﬁnition 2 (Goods are Substitutes). Valuation vi satisﬁes goods are substitutes
if for all linear prices p,p′ such that p′ ≥ p (component-wise), and all S ∈ Di(p),
there exists T ∈ Di(p′) such that {j ∈ S : pj = p′
j} ⊆ T.
The goods are substitutes (or simply substitutes) condition requires that a bidder
will continue to demand items that do not change in price as the price on other
items increases. Substitutes valuations include unit-demand valuations with
vi(S) = maxj∈S{vij} for all S and value vij on item j in isolation, but preclude
the possibility of items with complementary values (Lehmann, Lehmann, and
Nisan 2001).
Conditions for the existence of non-linear but anonymous CE prices are less
well-understood, but sufﬁcient conditions presented in Parkes (2001) (Theorem
4.7) include supermodular valuations, single-minded bidders that value a
particular bundle, and bidders with safe valuations such that each pair of bundles
with positive value to a bidder share at least one item. Consider, for example, a
bidder in the FCC spectrum auction that deﬁnitely needs lower Manhattan, along
with as many of the geographically neighboring licenses as possible.
2.2 Minimal Competitive Equilibrium Prices
In fact, many iterative CAs are designed to converge to minimal CE prices. This
can be useful for two reasons. First, minimal CE prices on bundles in the efﬁcient
allocation correspond to VCG payments for a restricted class of valuations. In this
case, we say that the CE prices support the VCG payments. Termination with CE
prices that support VCG payments brings straightforward bidding into an ex post
equilibrium. Second, Ausubel and Milgrom (2000, also Chapter 3) show that
7implementing minimal CE prices (corresponding to buyer-optimal core outcomes)
avoids the problems that can occur with the VCG auction when VCG payments
are not supported with minimal CE prices.
Deﬁnition 3 (Minimal CE Prices). Minimal CE prices minimize the seller’s
total revenue Πs(S∗,p) on the efﬁcient allocation S∗ across all CE prices.
A bidder’s payment in the VCG mechanism is always less than or equal to the
payment by that bidder at any CE price (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002). Thus,
minimal CE prices always provide an upper-bound on VCG payments. Moreover,
a bidder’s VCG payment is equal to the CE price on her efﬁcient bundle in some
CE (Parkes and Ungar 2000b).
A characterization in terms of the coalitional value function explains when the
VCG can be supported simultaneously to all bidders in the minimal CE.
Let w(L) for L ⊆ I denote the coalitional value for a subset L of bidders, equal
to the value of the efﬁcient allocation for CAP(L). The buyers are substitutes
(BAS) condition requires,
w(I) − w(I \ K) ≥
X
i∈K
[w(I) − w(I \ i)], ∀K ⊂ I (BAS)
Theorem 2. (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002) A buyers are substitutes (BAS)
coalitional value function is necessary and sufﬁcient to support the VCG
payments in competitive equilibrium.
In particular, the VCG payments are implemented in the minimal CE (or
buyer-optimal core) when BAS holds, and buyer-optimal core payoffs are unique
exactly when BAS holds.
A number of ascending price CAs can only terminate with minimal CE prices
given a slightly stronger condition, that of a buyer-submodular (BSM) coalitional
value function:
w(L) − w(L \ K) ≥
X
i∈K
[w(L) − w(L \ i)], ∀K ⊂ L,∀L ⊆ I (BSM)
8Bikhchandani and Ostroy (Chapter 8) refer to BSM as buyers are strong
substitutes. Clearly, a BSM coalitional value function also satisﬁes BAS. But
there are cases for which values satisfy BAS but not BSM (see Ausubel and
Milgrom 2002, Section 7, for example). Interestingly, substitutes valuations
implies BSM and is almost necessary. Roughly, if at least one bidder does not
satisfy substitutes then one can construct substitutes valuations for other bidders
such that the coalitional value function fails BSM. See Ausubel and Milgrom
(Chapter 1) for further discussion. Thus, the same conditions for the existence of
a linear price equilibrium are sufﬁcient and almost necessary for the existence of
some price equilibrium (although perhaps non-linear and non-anonymous) that
supports the Vickrey outcome.4
2.3 Universal Competitive Equilibrium Prices
Experiments have suggested that BAS can often fail in realistic settings for CAs.5
In these cases the VCG payments are not supported in any price equilibrium. We
can still design price-based CAs by characterizing a stronger condition on CE
prices that implies enough information to determine VCG payments from these
prices. For this, we restrict attention to the universal CE prices (Parkes and Ungar
2002, Mishra and Parkes 2004).
Deﬁnition 4 (Universal CE Prices). Prices p are universal Competitive
Equilibrium (UCE) prices if:
a) Prices p are CE prices.
b) Prices p−i are CE prices for CAP(I \ i), meaning they support some
efﬁcient allocation in CAP(I \ i), for all bidders i.
where p−i = (p1,...,pi−1,pi+1,...,pn).
In words, prices are UCE when an efﬁcient allocation for the restricted allocation
problem without bidder i is supported with prices p−i, for each bidder i removed
9in turn. Thus, UCE prices are CE prices in the main economy and in every
marginal economy. Note that UCE prices need not require that the same
allocation is supported in every marginal economy. The prices must support some
efﬁcient allocation in each marginal economy.6
UCE prices always exist, for example pi = vi, for all bidders i, are UCE prices.
Moreover, a universal price equilibrium provides sufﬁcient information about
bidder valuations to compute the VCG outcome.
Theorem 3. (Parkes and Ungar 2002) Given a UCE with prices puce and an
efﬁcient allocation S∗, the VCG payment to bidder i is computed as:
pvcg,i = puce,i(S∗
i ) − [Π∗
I(puce) − Π∗
I\i(puce)] (4)
where Π∗
L(p) = maxS∈Γ
P
i∈L pi(Si) for bidders L ⊆ I.
In the special case when prices are equal to valuations then this adjustment is
equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of VCG payments.
2.4 Informational Requirements
Both CE and UCE prices have a central role in the preference elicitation problem.
First, any auction that implements an efﬁcient allocation must determine a set of
CE prices. Second, any auction that implements the Vickrey outcome must
determine a set of UCE prices. Segal (Chapter 11) provides an extended
discussion.
Since the VCG auction is basically unique amongst the class of efﬁcient auctions
that take a zero payment from losing bidders (Ausubel and Milgrom, Chapter 1),
these equivalences conﬁrm the central role of prices in developing iterative CAs.
Theorem 4. (Parkes 2002, Nisan and Segal 2003) A combinatorial auction
realizes the efﬁcient allocation if and only if the auction also realizes a set of CE
prices and an allocation supported in the price equilibrium.
10This result requires a technical condition of privacy-preservation, which
precludes bidders from making their valuations contingent on the valuations of
other bidders (e.g. “my value for A is at least bidder 2’s value for A”).7
Theorem 5. (Parkes and Ungar 2002, Lahaie and Parkes 2004b) A
combinatorial auction realizes the VCG outcome if and only if the auction also
realizes a set of UCE prices and an allocation supported in the price equilibrium
of the main economy.
That UCE prices provide sufﬁcient information was ﬁrst proved in Parkes and
Ungar (2002). The necessary direction is due to Lahaie and Parkes (2004b). It is
important to realize that the CE and UCE prices referenced in these results may
only be realized implicitly and are not necessarily explicitly constructed in the
auctions.
Considering minimal CE prices in particular, Mishra and Parkes (2004) note that
minimal CE prices are universal iff BAS holds. In general, UCE prices are greater
than the minimal CE prices because they must consider competition in the
marginal economies in addition to the main economy.
The informational equivalence between the efﬁcient outcome and the problem of
discovering CE prices leads to a (largely negative) characterization of the
worst-case communication complexity and preference-elicitation requirements of
any efﬁcient CA, iterative or otherwise (Segal, Chapter 11). On the other hand,
iterative CAs are designed to have good elicitation properties on typical instances,
while sealed-bid auctions must suffer the worst case every time. Moreover, this
price equivalence suggests the central role of prices in the design of iterative CAs.
Any protocol to determine the VCG outcome must (implicitly) determine UCE
prices, so why not construct protocols to converge directly to UCE prices? We
return to this theme in Section 4.
112.5 Examples
The following examples illustrate the concept of CE and UCE prices and also
serve to illustrate the principle that it is often unnecessary to receive complete
information about bidder valuations to determine the Vickrey outcome. For each
example, we deﬁne a space of valuations (that contain the true valuations) that
provides sufﬁcient information to determine the Vickrey outcome. The
information is minimal— we call this a minimal information set —in the sense
that no relaxed constraints on valuations are sufﬁcient to pin down the Vickrey
outcome.
Example 2.1
Consider a single-item auction with three bidders and values (10,8,6). The
efﬁcient allocation assigns the item to bidder 1, and the Vickrey payment is $8.
Prices 10 ≥ p ≥ 8 are all in CE, and p = $8 is the unique anonymous UCE price.
Notice that the UCE price must be at least $8 to satisfy CE condition (1) for
bidder 2 in CAP({1,2,3}) but no greater than $8 to satisfy the same condition for
bidder 2 in CAP({2,3}). The CE prices deﬁne a minimal information set, ˆ V1,
deﬁned as the subset of valuations that satisfy constraints
{v1 ≥ p,v2 ≤ p,v3 ≤ p,10 ≥ p ≥ 8}. UCE prices imply additional information
{v2 = 8,v3 ≤ 8}, which together with ˆ V1 is a minimal information set for the
VCG outcome. Notice that an ascending price (i.e. English) auction can elicit this
information if bidders 1 and 2 bid up the price to just above 8, at which point the
auction terminates. Bidder 3 can remain silent.
Example 2.2
Consider a combinatorial allocation problem with items {A,B} and 5 bidders
(see Figure 2.1). The efﬁcient allocation allocates A to bidder 1 and B to bidder 2
for a total value of 70. The VCG payments are pvcg,1 = 30 − (70 − 65) = 25 and
pvcg,2 = 40 − (70 − 55) = 25. Figure 2.1 (b) illustrates an information set on
12bidder valuations, that is sufﬁcient to compute the VCG outcome and minimal in
the sense that no constraints can be relaxed. The following prices are UCE for any
valuation in this set: p(A) = 25,p(B) = 25,p(AB) = 25 to bidders {1,2,4,5}
and prices p3(A) = 20,p3(B) = 20,p3(AB) = 40 to bidder 3. In fact, these
prices are also minimal CE prices and the discount computed in Eq. 4 is zero for
bidders 1 and 2, and BAS is satisﬁed (because of the presence of bidders 4 and 5).
Without these bidders, the BAS condition fails and the VCG payments become
pvcg,1 = 0 and pvcg,2 = 20, which can be computed from UCE prices
p1 = (20,0,20),p2 = (0,40,40) and p3 = (0,20,40). Additional information is
needed from bidder 2 in this variation.
3 The Design Space for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
The design space for iterative CAs is larger than for one-shot auctions. Important
considerations include the design of information feedback to bidders and rules to
guide the submission of bids. Cramton (Chapter 4) provides an in-depth
discussion of many of these issues in the design of simultaneous ascending price
auctions.
Let the state of an auction include all the information that is sufﬁcient to deﬁne
the future dynamics of the auction. For example, the state of an auction can deﬁne
the ask prices, the provisional allocation, and also the bid improvement rules as
they apply to particular bidders. Brieﬂy, we can consider the role of the following
design features:
Timing issues. Iterative auctions may be continuous, allowing bids to be
submitted at any time with continual updates to the current provisional
allocation and prices. Alternatively, iterative auctions may be discrete, or
round-based, with the state updated periodically and with bidders provided
with an opportunity to revise bids between rounds.
Continuous auctions can promote faster propagation of feedback
information to bidders and help to quickly focus elicitation. However,
13continuous combinatorial auctions can be infeasible because the
winner-determination problem must be resolved whenever a new bid is
submitted. Continuous auctions also lead to high monitoring and
participation costs for bidders. In comparison, discrete auctions allow an
auctioneer to publish a schedule for rounds in the auction and bidders can
plan when to allocate time to reﬁne their values and bids.
Information feedback. Information feedback about the state of an auction can
include information about the bids submitted and also aggregate
information, such as price feedback and the current provisional allocation,
to guide bidding. Information hiding is also possible, for example with
rounding to limit the potential for signaling between bidders and with
limited and discriminatory reporting of bid information.
Information feedback policies make a tradeoff between serving the goal of
providing effective bid guidance and minimizing the opportunity for
collusion and other forms of manipulation through signaling and
coordination.
Bidding Rules. Ask prices are a common form of bid improvement rule, placing
a lower-bound on the allowable bid price on a bundle. Bid improvement
rules can also require a minimal percentage improvement over the current
highest bid on a bundle, or over the total revenue in the next round given
current bids. Activity rules (Milgrom 2000) introduce further restrictions,
such as requiring that a bidder bids for a decreasing market share as prices
increase during an auction. Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom (Chapter 5)
provide an extended discussion of bid-improvement and activity rules.
Activity rules were introduced in the early FCC wireless spectrum auctions
and proved important.8 Decisions about appropriate rules are often guided
by a tradeoff between providing expressiveness so that bidders can follow
straightforward bidding strategies, while promoting early information
14exchange between bidders and limiting the opportunity for bidders to wait
and snipe at the end of an auction. Computational considerations also
matter, for example linear prices can simplify the problem facing bidders in
an auction (Kwasnica, Ledyard, Porter, and DeMartini 2004) but can be
expensive to compute (Hoffman 2001).
Termination Conditions. Auctions may close at a ﬁxed deadline, perhaps with
an opportunity for a ﬁnal sealed-bid round of bidding (sometimes called a
proxy round). Alternatively, auctions can have a rolling closure with the
auction kept open while one or more losing bidders continue to submit
competitive bids.
Fixed deadlines are useful in settings in which bidders are impatient and
unwilling to wait a long time for an auction to terminate. However, ﬁxed
deadlines tend to require stronger activity rules to prevent the auction
reducing to a sealed-bid auction with bids delayed until the ﬁnal round. In
comparison, rolling closure rules have been shown to promote early and
sincere bidding.9
Bidding Languages. A bid can be a complex object and expressed in terms of
logical connectives (Nisan, Chapter 9). One popular bidding language is
exclusive-or (XOR), in which bid (p1,S1) xor (p2,S2) xor ... xor (pl,Sl)
has semantics “I will buy at most one of these bundles” at the stated bid
price. Another popular language is additive-or (OR) bidding languages, in
which bid (p1,S1) or (p2,S2) or ... or (pl,Sl) has semantics “I will buy
one or more of these bundles” at the stated bid price. Bidding languages can
also place constraints on the bid prices, for example by requiring click-box
bidding in which bidders must submit bids from a menu.10
The expressiveness of a bidding language in an iterative CA must be
considered together with the opportunity to reﬁne bids during an auction.
For instance, a language that is additive-or on items is not expressive in a
15one-shot CA but becomes expressive in an ascending auction when bidders
can decommit from bids.11 Bidding languages are often designed to support
straightforward bidding with bidders able to state the bundle that maximizes
their surplus in response to prices in each round.
Proxy agents. Proxy agents provide a still richer interface for iterative CAs
(Parkes and Ungar 2000b, Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). Bidders can
provide direct value information to an automated bidding agent that bids on
their behalf within an auction. The bidder-to-proxy language should allow a
bidder to express partial and incomplete information, to be reﬁned during
the auction, in order to realize the elicitation and price discovery beneﬁts of
an iterative auction.
Proxy agents can query a bidder actively when they have insufﬁcient
information to submit bids. Proxy agents can also facilitate faster
convergence with rapid automated proxy rounds interleaved with bidder
rounds. Mandatory proxy agents can be useful in restricting the strategy
space available to bidders.
One concern in the design of proxy auctions is to determine when to allow
proxy information to be revised and to determine the degree of consistency
to enforce across revisions. An additional concern is that of trust and
transparency since the bidding activity is transferred to automated agents.
4 Price-Based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Many iterative CAs are price based and provide ask prices to guide bidding. In
this section we survey some of these auction designs. We limit our attention to
auctions designed for valuations that are rich enough to include the substitutes
valuations. As such, we exclude the assignment model in which bidders have
unit-demand for items. See Bikhchandani and Ostroy (Chapter 8) for a taxonomy
that includes this case.
16All the auctions that we discuss share the same high level structure:
In each round the auctioneer announces ask prices and a provisional allocation
and requests new bids from bidders. The bids are used to formulate a new
winner-determination problem and update the provisional allocation, and also to
adjust ask prices and test for termination.
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the characteristics of some well-known auctions,
stating properties for straightforward (non-strategic) bidding. For the cases in
which an auction terminates with the VCG outcome this assumption is justiﬁed in
an ex post equilibrium but otherwise one should expect incentives for demand
reduction. The auctions are described in terms of the structure of the price space,
the bidding language, and the method used to update prices.
17Name Valuations Price structure Bidding Price Update Outcome
language method
KC substitutes non-anon items OR-items greedy CE
SAA substitutes items OR-items greedy CE
GS substitutes items XOR minimal min CE12
Aus substitutes items single greedya VCG
iBundle; Ascending-proxyb BSM non-anon bundles XOR greedy VCG
... general ... ... ... min CE
dVSV BSM non-anon bundles XOR minimal VCG
Clock-proxy BSM items (+ proxy)c XOR greedy VCG
... general ... ... ... min CE
RAD general items OR LP-based —
AkBA general anon bundles XOR LP-based —
iBEA general non-anon bundles XOR greedyd VCG
MP general non-anon bundles XOR minimald VCG
Table 2.1: Price-Based Combinatorial Auctions. Formal properties are stated for
straightforward bidding, and with the most general class of valuations for which
the property holds. Notation ‘—’ in the Outcome column indicates that no formal
properties have been established.
Notes:
a Aus traces n + 1 trajectories.
b Ascending-proxydynamics are identical to iBundle(3), although ascending-proxy
emphasizes a sealed-bid proxy auction form.
c Clock-proxy is a hybrid design, with a linear-price clock auction
followed by a sealed-bid ascending-proxyauction.
d Ascending price while the auction is open, followed by a downwards adjustment
after termination.
Abbreviations:
KC (Kelso and Crawford 1982) SAA (Milgrom 2000)
GS (Gul and Stacchetti 2000) Aus (Ausubel 2002)
iBundle (Parkes and Ungar 2000a) Ascending-proxy(Ausubel and Milgrom 2002)
dVSV (de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra 2003) Clock-proxy (Ausubel and Milgrom, Chapter 5)
RAD (Kwasnica et al. 2003) AkBA (Wurman and Wellman 2000)
iBEA (Parkes and Ungar 2002) MP (Mishra and Parkes 2004)
We see a wide variety of prices, from simple prices on items (linear prices) to
non-anonymous prices on bundles (non-anonymous and non-linear). In addition,
the auctions vary in the bids that a bidder can submit in each round: OR-items, an
additive-or bid for multiple items; XOR, an exclusive-or bid for multiple bundles;
single, a bid on a single bundle in each round; OR, an additive-or bid for multiple
18bundles. The XOR language has emerged as the deﬁnitive choice in recent
designs.
The price-update methods, which characterize the rules by which prices are
computed in each round, are broken down as follows:
Greedy update: The price is increased on some arbitrary set (perhaps all) of the
over-demanded items or bundles.
Minimal update: The price is increased on a minimal set of overdemanded
items, or based on the bids from a set of minimally undersupplied bidders.
LP-based: A linear program, formulated to ﬁnd prices that are good
approximations to CE prices given current bids, is used to adjust prices.
For linear prices, Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) in the assignment model
and later Gul and Stacchetti (2000) for substitutes deﬁne a minimal update in
terms of increasing the prices on a minimal overdemanded set of items.13
Minimal price updates are adopted to drive prices towards minimal CE prices. de
Vries, Schummer and Vohra (2003) generalize this to deﬁne updates in terms of
minimally undersupplied bidders14 and deﬁne a minimal update for general CAs.
All bidders in a minimally undersupplied set face higher prices on the bundles for
which they submitted a bid.
RAD and AkBA adopt LP-based price updates and adjust prices to ﬁnd good
approximations to CE prices given current bids and the current provisional
allocation. RAD seeks linear and anonymous prices while AkBA seeks non-linear
but anonymous price approximations. Formal convergence properties have not
been proved for RAD or AkBA, although RAD reduces to a simultaneous
ascending price auction for substitutes valuations.
The auctions that are able to implement the VCG outcome (for instance, Aus for
substitutes and dVSV for BSM coalitional values) are interesting because they
bring straightforward bidding into an equilibrium. Straightforward bidding is a
19best response, whatever the valuations of other bidders, as long as the other
bidders also follow a straightforward (perhaps untruthful) bidding strategy. This
ex post equilibrium concept is useful because it places no requirements on the
knowledge that bidders have of the valuations of other bidders.
Winning bidders pay their ﬁnal bid price in all auctions except Aus, iBEA and MP.
Aus allows for (n + 1) restarts and uses information elicited along each trajectory
to determine the ﬁnal payments. iBEA and MP terminate with UCE prices, at
which point ﬁnal payments are determined through downwards adjustments.
Auction clock-proxy (Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom Chapter 5) is a hybrid
auction. The ﬁrst stage maintains item prices and runs an ascending-clock CA
(see also Porter, Rassenti, and Smith (2003)). This stage is used for price
discovery and can be considered to construct approximate linear CE prices. The
second stage is sealed-bid, with bids from the ﬁrst stage combined with additional
bids that must be consistent with bids from the clock phase.
4.1 Insufﬁciency of Simple Prices
It is interesting to consider what form of prices are necessary to implement
efﬁcient ascending CAs. Gul and Stacchetti (2000) ﬁrst addressed this question,
in the setting of substitutes valuations. The authors provide a formal deﬁnition of
an ascending CA, but limit attention to linear and anonymous prices. They show
that there exists no ascending VCG auction with linear and anonymous prices for
substitutes valuations. The auction due to Ausubel (2002) lies outside of this
negative characterization because it uses n + 1 price trajectories.
Recently, Mishra and Parkes (2004) used the UCE-based price characterization to
demonstrate that efﬁcient ascending CAs require both non-anonymous and
non-linear prices, even for this case of substitutes valuations. The authors exhibit
instances for which only non-anonymous and non-linear UCE prices exist. As for
sufﬁciency, auctions dVSV and iBundle are examples of ascending VCG auctions
for substitutes valuations that maintain these rich prices.
20However, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2003) extend the deﬁnition of
ascending CAs in Gul and Stacchetti (2000) to allow for non-anonymous and
non-linear prices and obtain a negative result. When at least one bidder has a
non-substitutes valuation an ascending CA cannot implement the VCG outcome
even when the other bidders are restricted to substitutes and even with
non-anonymous and non-linear prices. Auctions iBEA and MP lie outside of this
negative characterization because they allow a ﬁnal downwards adjustment to
determine ﬁnal prices.
Thus, with substitutes values but simple prices we must accept auctions with
multiple trajectories or non-monotonic adjustments. Moreover, although rich
prices extend the reach of ascending CAs to substitutes values we still need to
accept multiple trajectories or non-monotonic adjustments to handle richer
preferences than substitutes.
4.2 Primal-Dual Auction Design
Many traditional combinatorial optimization problems can be solved with
primal-dual algorithms. A primal-dual approach uses linear-programming (LP)
duality to formulate an optimization problem as a satisfaction problem. Strong LP
duality states that a pair of feasible primal and dual solutions are optimal if and
only if they satisfy complementary slackness (CS) conditions. We provide a brief
review of LP theory at the end of this chapter, and refer the reader to
Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1998) for a textbook treatment.
In fact, primal-dual theory also provides a useful conceptual framework for the
design of iterative price-based CAs. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual
solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution.
Bids provide sufﬁcient information to formulate and solve restricted primal and
dual problems, the winner-determination and price-update problems respectively
(see Figure 2.2). For further discussion of this idea, see Parkes (2001), de Vries,
Schummer and Vohra (2003) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (Chapter 8).
21Straightforward bidding is ﬁrst assumed, and later justiﬁed by termination with
VCG payments. The winner-determination problem uses information implicit in
bids to compute a feasible solution that minimizes the violation of the CS
conditions, and price updates adjust the dual solution towards an optimal dual
solution.15 CS conditions have an exact equivalence with conditions (1) and (2)
required for CE prices, and are satisﬁed on termination of an auction.
Constructively, primal-dual auction design requires the following steps:
1. Formulate an LP for the CAP that is integral, such that its optimal solution
is a feasible allocation. The dual problem should allow convergence to UCE
prices, or to minimal CE prices that support VCG payments in the case of
BAS valuations.
2. Provide bidders with a bidding language that is expressive for
straightforward bidding, and formulate a winner-determination problem to
compute a feasible primal solution that minimizes the violation of CS
conditions as represented in bids.
3. Terminate when the provisional allocation and ask prices satisfy CS
conditions (and thus represent a CE), and also satisfy any additional
conditions that are necessary to compute the VCG payments at termination
(e.g. UCE conditions or minimal CE prices). Otherwise, adjust prices to
make progress towards an optimal dual solution that satisﬁes these
conditions.
The characterization of VCG payments in terms of minimal CE and UCE prices
suggests two methods to adjust towards the VCG outcome. The methods are
illustrated in Figure 2.3, which considers the price on bundles, S1 and S2,
allocated to bidders 1 and 2 in the efﬁcient outcome.
In case (a), the coalitional value function satisﬁes BSM and the VCG payments
are supported at the minimal CE prices. Ascending CAs (such as dVSV) can
22converge monotonically to these prices and the VCG outcome. In case (b), the
coalitional value function satisﬁes neither BSM not BAS. Although each bidder’s
VCG payment is supported in some minimal CE there is no single CE that
supports the VCG payment to both bidders simultaneously. As illustrated,
ascending CAs such as iBEA and MP can still converge monotonically to UCE
prices from which the VCG outcome can be determined in a ﬁnal adjustment.
The next section presents a case study of primal-dual methods to the design and
analysis of the iBundle auction.16 In Section 4.4 we return to the auctions in Table
2.1, and discuss each in a little more detail.
4.3 Case Study: iBundle
We will focus on variation iBundle(2), in which prices are non-linear but
anonymous. This variation is efﬁcient with straightforward bidding and an
additional requirement that bidder strategies satisfy a “safety” property. Later, we
also brieﬂy describe iBundle(3), which employs non-linear and non-anonymous
prices and is efﬁcient without the safety condition.
The interested reader is referred to Parkes and Ungar (2000a) and Parkes (2001)
for additional details, including a description of iBundle(d), which blends
iBundle(2) and iBundle(3) and allows for dynamic price discrimination decisions
to be made during the auction. In what follows, we will use iBundle to refer to
variation iBundle(2) unless otherwise stated.
iBundle(2): Anonymous Prices
iBundle maintains ask prices on bundles and a provisional allocation and proceeds
in rounds, indexed t ≥ 1. In each round a bidder can submit XOR bids on
bundles. In general the bid price on a bundle must be at least the ask price.
Bidders must resubmit bids on any bundle that they are winning in the current
provisional allocation but can bid at the same price on such a bundle even if the
ask price has since increased. A bidder can also bid at ǫ less than the ask price
23when making a “last-and-ﬁnal” bid, at which point she can no longer improve her
price. Equivalently, one can simply retain all bids from previous rounds. A bid at,
or above, the current ask price is said to be competitive, and a bidder is
competitive if she submits at least one competitive bid.
The winner-determination problem in each round is to compute a provisional
allocation to maximize the seller’s revenue given bids, with at most one bundle
selected from the XOR bid of each bidder. Let Bi denote the bids from bidder i,
and pbid,i(S) denote the bid price on bundle S ∈ Bi. Winner determination can be
formulated as the following mathematical program:
max
xi(S)
X
i∈I
X
S∈Bi
xi(S)pbid,i(S)
s.t.
X
S∈Bi
xi(S) ≤ 1, ∀i (5)
X
i∈I
X
S∈Bi:j∈S
xi(S) ≤ 1, ∀j (6)
xi(S) ∈ {0,1}, ∀i,∀S ∈ Bi
Constraint (5) restricts the seller to selecting at most one bid from each bidder.
Constraint (6) ensures the allocation is feasible. Ties are broken ﬁrst to favor the
allocation from the previous round and then to maximize the number of winning
bidders.
iBundle terminates when each competitive bidder receives a bundle in the
provisional allocation. Otherwise, prices are increased, by ǫ above the bid price
on all bundles that receive a bid from some losing bidder in the current round and
the new allocation and prices are provided as feedback to bidders. Prices on other
bundles are implicitly adjusted to satisfy free disposal, although only bundles that
receive losing bids need to be explicitly quoted. On termination the provisional
allocation becomes the ﬁnal allocation, and bidders pay their ﬁnal bid prices.
iBundle maintains feasible primal and dual solutions to an extended LP
formulation of CAP and terminates with a CE outcome that satisﬁes CS
24conditions. The proof technique is inspired by Bertsekas’ (1987) analysis of the
AUCTION algorithm for the special case of unit-demand valuations.
Given ask prices, pi(S), to bidder i we deﬁne ǫ straightforward bidding in terms
of an ǫ-demand set, ǫ-DS, which is:
ǫDi(pi) = {S : vi(S) − pi(S) + ǫ ≥ max
S′ (vi(S′) − pi(S′),0),∀S ⊆ G}
(ǫ-DS)
In words, bidders state in their bid all bundles that come within ǫ of maximizing
their surplus given prices in each round. This reduces to straightforward bidding
for a small enough ǫ.
Deﬁnition 5 (Safety). The competitive bundles in the ǫ-demand set of each losing
bidder in each round are non-disjoint, i.e. each pair of bundles shares at least one
item.
For example, losing bids {(ABC,$100),(CDE,$50)} from a single bidder
satisfy safety, while losing bids {(ABC,$100),(DE,$50)} from a single bidder
fail the safety condition.
Theorem 6. (Parkes and Ungar 2000a) iBundle(2) terminates with an allocation
that is within 3min(n,m)ǫ of the efﬁcient solution for ǫ-straightforward bidding
strategies and with bid safety.
The ﬁrst step of the proof is to introduce an extended LP formulation (LP2) for
CAP due to Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002, see also Chapter 8). LP2 is integral
when the safety condition holds for straightforward bidding. The dual formulation
(DLP2) has variables that correspond to anonymous and non-linear prices.
Let K denote the set of feasible partitions. For example, (A,B,C) and (AB,C)
are feasible partitions for items ABC. Variable y(k) = 1 will indicate that the
allocation must be restricted to bundles in partition k ∈ K. For example, if
partition (AB,C) is selected then the only valid allocations are those in which
25AB goes to some bidder and C to another bidder. We have:
max
xi(S),y(k)
X
S⊆G
X
i∈I
xi(S)vi(S) [LP2]
s.t.
X
S⊆G
xi(S) ≤ 1, ∀i
X
i∈I
xi(S) ≤
X
k∈K:S∈k
y(k), ∀S
X
k∈K
y(k) ≤ 1
xi(S),y(k) ≥ 0, ∀i,S,k
min
πi,p(S),Πs
X
i∈I
πi + Πs [DLP2]
s.t. πi + p(S) ≥ vi(S), ∀i,S
Πs −
X
S∈k
p(S) ≥ 0, ∀k
πi,p(S),Πs ≥ 0, ∀i,S
Dual variable p(S) can be interpreted as the ask price on bundle S. Then, optimal
π∗
i = maxS{vi(S) − p(S),0} deﬁnes the maximal payoff to bidder i across all
bundles given prices, and optimal Π∗
s = maxk∈K
P
S∈k p(S) deﬁnes the maximal
revenue to the seller across all partitions given prices. This is also the maximal
revenue across all allocations because prices are anonymous.
The dual problem sets prices to minimize the sum of the maximal payoff to each
bidder and the maximal revenue to the seller. Optimal dual prices will correspond
to CE prices whenever the primal LP is integral.
Interpret the provisional allocation and ask prices in a round of iBundle(2) as
deﬁning a feasible primal and a feasible dual solution (denoted ˆ x, ˆ y, ˆ πi, ˆ p, and
ˆ Πs). We can now establish termination with CS conditions for straightforward
bidding strategies.
The ﬁrst primal CS condition is:
ˆ xi(S) >0 ⇒ ˆ πi + ˆ p(S) = vi(S), ∀i,S (CS-1)
26This states that any bundle allocated to bidder i must maximize her payoff across
all bundles at the prices. Condition (CS-1) is approximately satisﬁed in every
round because the provisional allocation is selected with respect to bids, which
are in turn drawn from ǫ demand sets. Formally, a relaxed form of condition
(CS-1) holds, with ˆ xi(S) > 0 ⇒ ˆ πi + ˆ p(S) ≤ vi(S) + 2ǫ, for all i and S.
The second primal CS condition is:
ˆ y(k) > 0 ⇒ ˆ Πs −
X
S∈k
ˆ p(S) = 0, ∀k (CS-2)
This states that the provisional allocation must maximize the seller’s payoff (i.e.
revenue) given the prices, across all feasible allocations and irrespective of bids
received from bidders.
Bundle S has a strictly positive price if it is greater than the price on every bundle
contained in S. Then, (CS-2) follows from properties (P1) and (P2), which are
maintained in each round of the auction:
(P1) All bundles with strict positive prices receive a bid from some bidder in
every round.
(P2) One or more of the revenue-maximizing allocations in every round can be
constructed from bids from different bidders.
Formally, (P1) follows because one can show that a losing bidder will continue to
bid for S in the next round, even at the higher price. Property (P2) follows from
the safety property, which prevents a single bidder from causing the price to
increase on a pair of disjoint bundles. This is why we need the safety condition.
Combining (P1) and (P2), and together with ǫ-DS, we get a relaxed formulation of
(CS-2), with ˆ y(k) > 0 ⇒ ˆ Πs −
P
S∈k ˆ p(S) ≤ min(m,n)ǫ, for all partitions
k ∈ K.
Dual CS condition (CS-3), states:
ˆ πi > 0 ⇒
X
S⊆G
ˆ xi(S) = 1, ∀i (CS-3)
27In words, every bidder with positive payoff for some bundle at the current prices
must receive a bundle in the provisional allocation. (CS-3) is satisﬁed for all
bidders that receive bundles in a particular round, but not for the losing bidders
that are still competitive. However, (CS-3) holds for every bidder on termination
because at this point ǫ−DS = ∅ for all losing bidders.
(CS-3) and (CS-1) are equivalent to CE condition (1) and (CS-2) together with an
additional requirement that a provisional allocation is always selected is
equivalent to CE condition (2).
Finally, we obtain an upper-bound on the worst-case efﬁciency error of iBundle,
in terms of the minimal bid increment ǫ. First, sum the approximate (CS-1)
condition over all bidders in the ﬁnal allocation, and substitute ˆ πi = 0 for bidders
not in the allocation by (CS-3). This gives:
X
i∈I
ˆ πi ≤
X
i∈I
vi(ˆ Si) −
X
i∈I
ˆ p(ˆ Si) + 2min(m,n)ǫ (7)
⇒ ˆ Πs +
X
i∈I
ˆ πi ≤
X
i∈I
vi(ˆ Si) + 3min(m,n)ǫ (8)
where Eq. (7) follows because an allocation can include no more bundles than
there are items or bidders, and Eq. (8) is by substitution of the ǫ-approximate
(CS-2) condition.
The LHS of Eq. (8) is the value of the ﬁnal dual solution, and the ﬁrst-term on the
RHS is the value of the ﬁnal primal solution. Now, ˆ Πs +
P
i ˆ πi ≥ w(I), (the
value of the optimal primal) by LP weak duality, and therefore
w(I) ≤ ˆ Πs +
P
i ˆ πi ≤
P
i vi(ˆ Si) + 3min(m,n)ǫ. ⊓ ⊔
A complete proof must also show termination. The basic idea is to assume the
auction never terminates and prove that a bidder must eventually submit a bid at a
price above her valuation, assuming ﬁnite values and a ﬁnite number of items,
from which we get a contradiction with straightforward bidding.
28iBundle(3): Non-anonymous Prices
iBundle(3) is the variation of iBundle in which each bidder faces non-anonymous
prices in every round. The dynamics of iBundle(3) with straightforward bidding
are identical to that of Ausubel and Milgrom’s (2002) ascending-proxy auction,
although ascending-proxy is not described in price terms. iBundle(3) is efﬁcient
for straightforward bidding with general values. Moreover, the auction will
terminate with VCG outcomes for BSM coalitional value functions.
Let pt
ask,i(S) denote the ask prices to bidder i in round t. Initially, p1
ask,i(S) = 0
for all bundles S and all bidders. Bids are received, and the winner determination
problem solved, as in iBundle(2). Then, for each bidder not in the provisional
allocation, the price to that bidder is increased by the minimal bid increment,
ǫ > 0, above her bid price on all bundles submitted in that round, and adjusted for
free-disposal.
It is now quite immediate to establish that iBundle(3) terminates in CE with
straightforward bidding. The prices faced by a bidder in round t are parameterized
by πt
i ≥ 0, which can be interpreted as the maximal payoff to the bidder in that
round. The ask price on bundle S in round t is deﬁned as:
pt
ask,i(S) = max(0,vi(S) − πt
i) (9)
Initially, π1
i = maxS{vi(S)}, for all i, and the price is zero on all bundles. The
payoff πt
i decreases monotonically during the auction and prices monotonically
increase. The ǫ-DS for bidder i in round t includes every bundle for which
vi(S) ≥ πt
i, and increases monotonically across rounds. Eventually, when πt
i is
less than ǫ the prices on each bundle are within ǫ of her value and she will bid for
every bundle with positive value in her ǫ-DS.17
Condition (CS-1) holds trivially in each round and (CS-3) holds at termination,
just as in iBundle(2). In addition, (CS-2) holds in each round because of the
special structure of prices: every bundle with a strict positive price receives a bid
in a bidder’s ǫ-DS. This does not require the safety condition.
29Theorem 7. (Parkes and Ungar 2000a) iBundle(3) terminates with an allocation
that is within 3min(n,m)ǫ of the efﬁcient allocation for ǫ-straightforward
bidding strategies and with bid safety.
Theorem 8. (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) iBundle(3) terminates with minimal
CE prices and the VCG outcome for BSM valuations and straightforward bidding.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder j, and let πj denote her payoff in the minimal
CE prices. Refer to the bidders in the provisional allocation in round t as the
winning coalition. We prove that the payoff, πt
j to bidder j in any round t satisﬁes
πt
j ≥ πj. First, bidder j must be in the winning coalition in any round in which
πt
j < πj. To see this, consider a coalition L ⊂ I, with j / ∈ L, and observe that the
revenue to the seller from coalition L in round t is exactly w(L) −
P
i∈L πt
i from
Eq. (9). Then,
w(L) −
X
i∈L
πt
i < w(L) −
X
i∈L
πt
i + (πj − πt
j)
= w(L) −
X
i∈L∪{j}
πt
i + w(I) − w(I \ j) (10)
≤ w(L) −
X
i∈L∪{j}
πt
i + w(L ∪ {j}) − w(L) (11)
= w(L ∪ {j}) −
X
i∈L∪{j}
πt
i
where Eq. (10) follows from the equivalence between maximal payoff and VCG
payoff for BSM valuations and Eq. (11) follows from the BSM condition. Thus,
the payoff to bidder j cannot fall more than ǫ below πj (since the bidder always
wins, and its prices are unchanged), and prices converge to the minimal CE prices
as ǫ → 0. ⊓ ⊔
An ex post equilibrium is invariant to the values of bidders, i.e. straightforward
bidding is an equilibrium even ex post once every bidder knows the values of
other bidders.
30Theorem 9. Straightforward bidding is an ex post equilibrium of iBundle(3), and
the auction is efﬁcient, for BSM valuations.
This result requires that the revealed preferences by a bidder are consistent with
some valuation during the auction.18 Given this, we can ﬁx the reports v−i of
other bidders. If bidder i follows a straightforward strategy the auction
implements the VCG outcome because valuations satisfy BSM. Moreover, if
bidder i reports some other valuation ˆ vi  = vi the auction implements the efﬁcient
allocation for (ˆ vi,v−i) and CE prices that are at least the bidder’s Vickrey
payment in that outcome. Thus, bidder i’s best-response is straightforward
bidding because her payoff in the truthful Vickrey outcome dominates her payoff
in any other Vickrey outcome, and therefore also in this alternate CE outcome.
4.4 Ascending Price Combinatorial Auctions
Perhaps the deﬁning feature of the iBundle family of auctions is that they allow
non-linear, and sometimes non-anonymous ask prices. Only the dVSV, iBEA and
MP auctions have a similarly rich class of prices. The other auctions in Table 2.1
maintain simpler prices, typically anonymous and often linear.
In describing the auctions we group together auctions KC, SAA, GS and Aus
because they are all designed to handle the special case of substitutes valuations.
Then we brieﬂy discuss dVSV, which is designed for a BSM coalitional value
function, and is presented in detail in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (Chapter 8). The
ascending-proxy auction is a sealed-bid implementation of iBundle(3) with
interesting theoretical properties, and will be discussed along with other proxied
auctions in Section 5.2 and presented in more detail in Ausubel and Milgrom
(Chapter 3). Finally, we describe the clock-proxy, iBEA and MP auctions, which
are designed for general valuations.
31Special-Case: Goods are Substitutes
Recall that linear CE prices exist for substitutes valuations, but that non-linear and
non-anonymous prices are still required to support VCG payments, even for
substitutes.
Auction KC was ﬁrst described in the setting of a matching problem, with
multiple ﬁrms and multiple workers. The matching problem can be reinterpreted
as an allocation problem with each ﬁrm corresponding to a bidder and each
worker to an item. Bidders can submit bids for multiple items in each round.
Winner determination allocates all items that receive bids and prices are increased
on over-demanded items. The auction converges to a competitive equilibrium
outcome and an efﬁcient allocation for straightforward bidding. Kelso and
Crawford (1982) do not investigate strategic behavior or the relationship between
the outcome and the VCG payoffs.
Auction SAA is closely related to KC in that bidders can submit bids for multiple
items and the bid on an item must be repeated if it is winning. However, SAA
maintains anonymous prices and is distinguished in its careful use of activity and
bid-improvement rules. The auction design forms the basis of the series of FCC
wireless spectrum auctions.
Auction GS adopts the same basic methodology as KC, except that prices are
anonymous and increased on a set of minimal overdemanded items. This provides
termination with minimal CE prices when bidders are straightforward. Just as in
KC and SAA, these prices do not support the VCG outcome for substitutes
valuations and straightforward bidding is not an equilibrium.
Auction Aus is unique amongst the auctions for substitutes valuations in its ability
to terminate with the Vickrey outcome. Ausubel (2002) achieves this despite
using only anonymous item prices by running n + 1 separate auctions, each with
its own price trajectory. Information across each auction is used to adjust ﬁnal
payments to VCG payments. Let (A−1,...,A−n,A), denote the sequence of
auctions in Aus, with bidder i excluded from participation in auction A−i. All
32bidders are invited to participate in the ﬁnal auction. The allocation is determined
in auction A, but the payment by bidder i is determined from the price and
bidding dynamics in auctions A−i and A. The dynamics in A−i are used to adjust
downwards the ﬁnal payment for bidder i.
Bidder Submodular
Auction dVSV is similar to iBundle, with bids for XOR sets of bundles and prices
that are non-linear and non-anonymous and increased based on bids from losing
bidders. However, the price update rule is different. dVSV increases prices on the
set of minimally-undersupplied bidders. This set can include bidders that are in
the current provisional allocation, as well as losing bidders, and is different from
the set of losing bidders on which prices are adjusted in iBundle. Although there
has been no computational study, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2003) argue by
analogy to algorithms in the optimization literature that dVSV will converge more
quickly than iBundle.19 In iBundle’s favor is that the price-update step is simple
to explain to bidders and easy to compute.
General-Purpose CAs
RAD and AkBA are general-purpose ascending CAs, designed without
restrictions on agent valuations. Although an equilibrium analysis is not available
for either auction their performance has been evaluated experimentally, through
human-based laboratory studies and through computational simulation. Both
auctions formulate an LP to adjust prices. AkBA provides non-linear prices and
supports an XOR bidding language while RAD provides linear prices and
supports an OR bidding language.
A competitive equilibrium perspective provides a unifying view of the auctions.
Recall that CE prices in CAP must be both non-linear and non-anonymous in
general. One can interpret AkBA as an iterative procedure to determine
anonymous and non-linear prices that approximate CE prices, and RAD as an
33iterative procedure to determine anonymous and linear prices that approximate
CE prices.
The bidding rules and winner-determination step in AkBA are much as in
iBundle. Each bidder submits an XOR bid, from which the winner-determination
problem is formulated. AkBA differs from iBundle in the price-update step,
which is parameterized with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Let St = (St
1,...,St
n) denote the provisional allocation in round t, pt
ask(S)
denote the ask price on S, ∆t(S′′,S′) = pt(S′′) − pt(S′) denote the price
difference between bundle S′′ and bundle S′, Wt denote the current winners, and
DSi(pt
ask) denote the bids submitted by bidder i in response to ask prices. AkBA
computes prices for period t + 1 that will maintain CS condition (CS-1) for all
bidders, given the demand-set information in their most recent bid.
In particular, prices pt+1
ask (S) are computed to satisfy:
a) pt+1
ask (S) ≥ pt(S), for all bundles S ∈ St that receive bids from some losing
bidder, i / ∈ Wt.
b) ∆t+1(S′′,S′) ≥ ∆t(S′′,S′) for any pair of bundles S′′,S′, such that S′ is
allocated to a winning bidder i ∈ Wt, and that bidder also bids on S′′.
These prices are not unique in general, and AkBA breaks the tie by selecting a
convex combination of prices, with pt+1
ask (S) = (1 − k)pt+1(S) + kpt+1(S),
where pt+1(S) and pt+1(S) are the minimal and maximal prices that satisfy
conditions a) and b), for some parameter 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Finally, new bids must improve the price by a minimal bid increment ǫ > 0 on at
least one bundle. The k = 1 variation, with price adjustments pt+1 is thought to
have better incentive properties (Wurman and Wellman 1999), and empirical
analysis has demonstrated high efﬁciency with straightforward bidders (Wurman
and Wellman 2000).
RAD provides an additive-or (OR) bidding language, and winner determination is
formulated to allow multiple bids to be accepted from any one bidder (Kwasnica,
Ledyard, Porter, and DeMartini 2004). Straightforward bidding is well deﬁned for
34the OR language when valuations have additive-or semantics (e.g. when the
bidder’s value for a disjoint combination of packages is the sum of the individual
package values).20 However, this OR language is not always expressive for
straightforward bidding. For example, a bidder with valuation
(AB,$20),(CD,$20),(ABCD,$20) facing prices (AB,$10) and (CD,$10)
can not represent her best-response demand set (either AB or CD but not both)
with an OR language.
RAD maintains linear and anonymous prices and formulates the price update as a
series of LPs. The methodology is close in spirit to methods due to Rassenti,
Smith and Bulﬁn (1982), where approximate prices are computed in a one-shot
CA.21 Let St = (St
1,...,St
n) denote the provisional allocation computed in round
t. RAD computes new linear prices that exactly match the bid price for all
winning bids, with
P
j∈St
i pt+1
ask (j) = pt
bid,i(St
i), and minimize the maximal regret
across losing bids, with regret deﬁned as the difference
max{0,pt
bid,i(S) −
P
j∈S pt+1
ask (j)}. Ties are broken ﬁrst to lexicographically
lower the regret on as many losing bids as possible, and then on prices for items in
winning bids to maximize the minimal price on each such bundle. This procedure
ensures a unique solution and is designed to provide bidders with informative
signals.
Experimental results in a laboratory with human bidders demonstrate that RAD
achieves higher efﬁciency than non-combinatorial auctions (Banks, Ledyard, and
Porter 1989). In addition, RAD is demonstrated to terminate with fewer rounds
than the SAA design, which typically has fewer rounds than simple ascending-bid
CAs (Cybernomics 2000).
Auctions iBEA (Parkes and Ungar 2002) and MP (Mishra and Parkes 2004) are
general purpose ascending Vickrey auctions. iBEA extends iBundle(3) to adjust
past the ﬁrst set of CE prices and achieve UCE prices with straightforward
bidding. This provides enough information to adjust downwards to VCG
payments upon termination, bringing straightforward bidding into an ex post
35equilibrium for general values. Similarly, MP extends the minimal price update
rule in dVSV, to ensure that the auction terminates with UCE prices. The same
tradeoff occurs between iBEA and MP as occurs between iBundle and dVSV.
Although one should expect MP to converge more quickly than iBEA, each price
update in iBEA is simple to compute and easier to explain to bidders.
5 Non Price-Based Approaches
We survey three examples of non price-based approaches to iterative CA design.
These auctions do not require that bidders submit bids in response to ask prices.
Instead, they include richer query models and are structured fundamentally
different than ascending-price auctions. The auctions fall into one of the
following categories:
Decentralized Approaches. The winner determination problem is moved to the
bidders, who are responsible for submitting bids and also computing
allocations of items with high revenue given existing bids. The Adaptive
User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) (Banks, Ledyard, and Porter 1989), a
continuous auction in which winner determination is distributed to bidders,
provides a canonical example.
Proxy Auctions. Proxy agents, which automatically submit bids through a
predetermined bidding procedure, provide an interface between bidders and
an auction. Bidders provide incremental value information to proxy agents,
which may query bidders actively.
Direct-Elicitation Approaches. (Conen and Sandholm 2001) Explicit queries
are formulated by the auctioneer (perhaps in a decentralized way), and a
bidder’s strategy determines how to respond to these queries. Multi-party
elicitation approaches are used to ensure that information reported by one
bidder can be used to reﬁne the queries asked of another bidder.
36There is perhaps some ambiguity between the proxy auctions approach and the
direct-elicitation approach. We choose to reserve the term proxy auction to
settings in which the proxy agents are restricted to following a straightforward
bidding strategy in an auction protocol. Direct-elicitation methods may also
distribute elicitation to individual proxy agents. However, the proxies in
direct-elicitation interact with a richer centralized protocol (more akin to a
computational procedure), that can itself be designed with knowledge that it will
be interacting with automated proxy agents.
5.1 Decentralized Approaches: The AUSM Design
AUSM is a continuous auction that maintains a list of provisional winning bids
and a standby queue. This standby queue contains bids that have been submitted
but are not provisionally winning, and is designed to allow bidders to coordinate
their bids. A bidder can always submit a bid to the queue and can also suggest a
new combination of bids from the queue that provide more revenue than the
current allocation. This proposed allocation becomes the new provisional
allocation. The bidding language within the queue is implicitly additive-or and
bidders are unable to place logical constraints between multiple bids in the queue.
AUSM terminates after a period of quiescence.
AUSM distributes the winner-determination computation across the bidders. The
auctioneer is only required to verify that a new provisional allocation is better
than the current allocation and that it is formed from bids in the standby queue.
Related ideas are found in the work of Brewer (1999) and the PAUSE auction
(Land, Powell and Steinberg, Chapter 6).
On one hand, this decentralization can remove a computational bottleneck from
iterative CAs. On the other hand, this decentralization can bias the outcome in
favor of technologically sophisticated bidders better able to solve larger
optimization problems. See Pekeˇ c and Rothkopf (Chapter 16) and Parkes and
Shneidman (2004) for an additional discussion of the incentive aspects of
37decentralized approaches to solving the winner-determination problem.
Another potential concern with AUSM is that bidders must be able to process the
disaggregated feedback provided in the auction, in the form of submitted bids.
Nevertheless, AUSM has been demonstrated to provide better allocative efﬁciency
than a non-combinatorial auction in experiments with human bidders (Banks,
Ledyard, and Porter 1989).
5.2 Proxied Auctions
Proxied auctions include automated proxy agents which interface between bidders
and the auctioneer and submit bids following a predetermined procedure. In an
ascending CA the proxies typically follow straightforward bidding strategies. If a
proxy agent is following a ﬁrst-best strategy (i.e. the bidding strategy that an
agent would follow with full information about a bidder’s value), then it must
elicit enough information to compute a best-response to prices in each round.
At one extreme, each proxy agent can require direct and complete revelation at the
start of the auction (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002, also Chapter 3). Of course, this
reduces the auction to a sealed-bid auction. However, when combined with a
bidder-to-proxy interface that allows bidders to provide incremental value
information, proxied auctions suggest a paradigm shift in iterative CAs from
indirect revelation (e.g. via best-response bids to prices) to incremental but direct
revelation (Parkes 2001, section 7.5).
Proxy agents can maintain partial information about valuations. For instance, this
information could be in the form of exact values for a subset of bundles, or
approximate values for each bundle. Proxy agents can decide when to query and
when to bid, based on a model of costly elicitation.
The bidder-to-proxy interface need not be constrained to logical languages such as
XOR or OR, and can be adapted to suit the local problem of a bidder. For
example, a bidder in a logistics problem can deﬁne the constraints and costs for
her local business problem. The ability to support this kind of expressiveness can
38prove decisive in practice.22
In addition to enriching the bidding language, proxy auctions can also offer the
following advantages:
a) Proxy auctions can restrict the dynamic strategies available to bidders, for
example by enforcing straightforward bidding based on reported valuations and
by requiring consistent information-revelation to proxies (see Section 7.5, Parkes
2001, and Ausubel and Milgrom 2002).
b) Proxy auctions offer opportunities for accelerated implementations of auctions,
because there can be multiple fast “proxy rounds” of bidding interleaved with a
few “human rounds” to reﬁne proxy’s value information, see Hoffman, Menon,
van der Heever, and Wilson (Chapter 17) and Wurman, Zhong and Cai (2004).23
In imposing strong activity rules, for instance to require that a bidder provides a
consistent response to queries during an auction, one must allow for bidder
mistakes and also for bidders that might be adjusting their beliefs about value as
they receive feedback (e.g. in a correlated value setting). Ausubel, Cramton and
Milgrom (Chapter 5) advocate using a relaxed consistency rule to provide
incentives for early demand revelation while allowing for these other effects.
5.3 Direct-Elicitation Approaches
A direct-elicitation approach formulate queries about bidder valuations, to which
bidders are expected to respond (although not necessarily truthfully). Queries are
typically interleaved across bidders so that the queries asked of one bidder can be
selected given responses by other bidders. In this way, complete elicitation can be
avoided through focused elicitation on interesting parts of the allocation space.
Sandholm and Boutilier (Chapter 10) provide an extended discussion of
direct-elicitation methods for the design of iterative CAs.
The query process in direct elicitation can be fully integrated within a
winner-determination algorithm to determine whether enough information is
available to implement an efﬁcient allocation (Conen and Sandholm 2001, e.g.).
39The query process may also be deﬁned through an algorithmic technique that does
not have a very natural analogue with traditional auction designs, such as
computational learning theory (Zinkevich, Blum, and Sandholm 2003, Lahaie and
Parkes 2004a).
Example queries can include: “is bundle S1 preferred to bundle S2?”; “is your
value on bundle S1 at least $100?”; and “what is your value on bundle S1?.” The
goal is to ask the minimal number of queries required to determine the efﬁcient
allocation and perhaps also to determine the VCG payments. Computing the VCG
payments brings truthful response by bidders into an ex post equilibrium.
We know that any elicitation process must also determine CE prices if the goal is
to determine an efﬁcient allocation, and UCE prices if the VCG outcome is
important (see Section 2). Thus, one reasonable approach is explicitly price
based, with elicitation structured as a search for CE prices. One can also consider
an allocation-based approach, with elicitation structured as a search for the
efﬁcient allocation.
Price based. Query bidders until the value information is sufﬁcient to verify a set
of UCE prices and a supporting allocation for the main economy. For
instance, one can simulate learning algorithms to elicit bidder valuations
until they are known with enough accuracy to determine UCE prices
(Lahaie and Parkes 2004a, Lahaie and Parkes 2004b).
Allocation-based. Query bidders until the value information provides a
certiﬁcate for the efﬁcient allocation and the Vickrey payments. Use partial
information to augment a search in allocation space, executing new queries
to reﬁne information that will resolve current uncertainty about the efﬁcient
allocation (Conen and Sandholm 2001, Hudson and Sandholm 2004).
As yet there are no published studies to compare the elicitation effectiveness and
computational scalability of price-based approaches and allocation-based
approaches. Price-based approaches may be fundamentally more scalable, with
40queries determined by solving optimization problems that are restricted by current
bidder responses, for instance via winner-determination problems deﬁned on
bundles returned by best-response queries. In comparison, allocation-based
approaches must strive to avoid maintaining an allocation graph that scales
exponentially with the number of items.24
Price-based approaches are also naturally decentralized: in a proxied architecture,
each proxy agent can elicit preference information independently until it has
enough information to determine its best-response to current prices. This
best-response information can verify that an allocation is efﬁcient even though
each proxy knows nothing about the values of other bidders.
Recently, methods from computational learning theory (CLT) have been adapted
to direct elicitation. CLT provides membership queries (“what is your value on
bundle S?”) and equivalence queries (“is your valuation function ˆ v? If not,
identify a bundle S for which ˆ v(S) is incorrect.”) In one approach, each proxy is
responsible for learning the exact value function of a single bidder in isolation
(Zinkevich, Blum, and Sandholm 2003, Blum, Jackson, Sandholm, and Zinkevich
2004). In another approach, Lahaie and Parkes (2004a) integrate CLT into
price-based approaches and use demand queries to simulate equivalence queries.
A demand query presents prices p and a bundle S and asks whether S is in the
demand set of the bidder at the prices. This coordinates elicitation across proxy
agents and provides an elicitation method that can terminate early as soon as CE
prices are discovered and without learning values exactly.
6 Summary
Iterative CAs are of critical importance in addressing the problem of preference
elicitation, which many view as the biggest issue to surmount in the real-world
deployment of CAs. The sophisticated combinatorial optimization and pricing
algorithms of CAs are impotent without rich bid information from bidders.
Iterative CAs focus elicitation, often through price discovery, and can ﬁnd
41efﬁcient allocations without bidders reporting, or even computing, their exact
value information. We emphasized price-based approaches, and in particular a
primal-dual design paradigm. Canonical non-price based approaches, including
proxied- and direct-elicitation approaches, were also discussed.
For a related discussion of the primal-dual approach to auction design see Chapter
8, and see also Chapters 3, 5 and 6 for discussions of speciﬁc iterative CAs.
Chapters 9, 10 and 11 relate to the discussion of bidding languages, elicitation,
and communication complexity. Chapter 17 discusses methods to accelerate the
computation of the outcome of a proxied ascending price CA.
Looking ahead, we see a number of outstanding problems in the design of
iterative CAs:
  Introduce the cost of preference elicitation more explicitly into the auction
design problem. Current methods are mainly ﬁrst best, and seek to ﬁnd an
efﬁcient allocation with as little information as possible. But what happens when
this minimal information remains too costly for bidders to provide? This is the
problem of designing second-best auctions, that make the right tradeoff between
the cost of information and the value of additional information in terms of
improving the market allocation. Some initial progress has been made in the
analysis of auction design with costly information (Compte and Jehiel
2000, Larson and Sandholm 2001, Fong 2003, Parkes 2004), and with bounded
communication (Blumrosen and Nisan 2002, Blumrosen, Nisan, and Segal 2003),
but much more work needs to be done.
  Design iterative CAs for which straightforward bidding is an ex post equilibrium,
but which do not suffer from the well-known vulnerabilities of the VCG auction
that are outlined by Ausubel and Milgrom (Chapter 1). These auctions will
necessarily not be allocatively efﬁcient, but may be more desirable due to new
robustness against manipulation by coalitions and improved revenue properties.
  Current auctions for general valuations for which theoretical results are available
use XOR bidding languages which are not concise enough to be usable for many
42real-world applications. We need iterative CAs that support richer bidding
languages, for instance allowing side constraints, volume discounts, and other
high-level bidding logic to be stated and then reﬁned during the auction.
43Notes
1One argument commonly made for why very few VCG mechanisms are seen
in practice is that bidders are reluctant to reveal their complete and true valua-
tions in a situation of long-term strategic interaction (Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn
1990).
2The observed vulnerabilities of the VCG auction can be viewed as problems
intrinsic to the task of implementing efﬁcient allocations in an ex post equilibrium
in iterative CAs, given the uniqueness of the VCG auction among efﬁcient auctions
(see Chapter 1).
3Goods aresubstitutes isthelargest set containing unit-demand valuations (with
vi(S) = maxj∈S{vij} for all S, where vij is the value for item j in isolation) for
which the existence of linear CE prices can be established (Gul and Stacchetti
1999).
4Gul & Stacchetti (1999) show that there is often no linear price equilibrium
that supports the VCG payments with substitutes valuations. On the other hand,
linear prices can support the VCG outcome for unit-demand valuations (Leonard
1983).
5Computational analysis on a broad test suite of problem instances demon-
strated failure of buyers are substitutes in around 43% of instances (Parkes 2001,
Chapter 7, pp.216).
6In fact, the prices will support all efﬁcient allocations in each marginal econ-
omy because prices that support any one efﬁcient allocation support all.
7Parkes(2002) uses agent-independence torefer toprivacy-preservation. Parkes
also requires an additional technical requirement (outcome-independence), that is
without loss of generality for “best-response bidding languages,” which are ex-
pressive enough to simulate at least the following bids: bundle S1 is worth at least
$100; and bundle S1 is worth at least $50 more than bundle S2; and bundle S1 has
value $200.
8The form of activity rule used in the FCC spectrum auctions is due to Paul
Milgrom and Robert Wilson. The rule requires quantities bid in the auction are
(weak) monotonically decreasing. Similar rules have since become standard in
ascending CAs.
9Roth and Ockenfels (2001) have studied the use of deadlines versus rolled
closures, on eBay and Amazon Internet auctions respectively. Bidders on Amazon
bid earlier than on eBay, and many bidders on eBay wait until the last seconds of
44an auction to bid.
10Click-box bidding was adopted by the FCCinthe light of evidence that bidders
used the trailing digits for signaling in early wireless spectrum auctions.
11Of course, arbitrary decommiting may be undesirable because it allows insin-
cere bidding and cheap talk.
12BAS holds and there is a set of minimal CE prices that will support the VCG
outcome. However, Guland Stacchetti’s (2000) auction maintains item prices and a
stronger condition, such as unit-demand valuations, is required for VCG payments
to be supported with linear CE prices.
13A set of items, S′ ⊆ G, are overdemanded when it is not possible to satisfy the
demand sets of bidders that demand only items in S′.
14A set L ⊆ I of bidders are undersupplied if not all bidders can be satisﬁed in
the provisional allocation.
15One can also imagine that each round of the auction closes the duality gap
between the feasible primal and dual solutions. At termination the duality gap is
zero, complementary slackness holds, and we have an efﬁcient allocation and CE
prices.
16Recently, de Vries, Schummer and Vohra (2003) observe a formal distinc-
tion between the subgradient approach adopted in iBundle and the primal-dual
approach adopted in dVSV and MP. One can view subgradient methods as a spe-
cialization of primal-dual, and thus we prefer to continue to adopt the primal-dual
terminology throughout this section.
17Speciﬁcally, the bidder need only bid for bundles S for which there are no
bundles S′ ⊂ S with vi(S′) = vi(S), i.e. taking advantage of sparse valuations.
18A simple way to achieve consistency is to use a proxy agent interface. The
proxy can follow a straightforward bidding strategy based on value information
reported by a bidder. A bidder can provide additional information as needed but
must be consistent during the course of the auction.
19In particular, de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2003) note that iBundle is more
correctly a subgradient algorithm while dVSV is a primal-dual algorithm. Primal-
dual algorithms are inherently faster than subgradient algorithms in the optimiza-
tion literature (Fisher 1981).
20This property is satisﬁed by the “spatial ﬁtting” environment used by Kwas-
nica, Ledyard, Porterand DeMartini (2004) inexperiments andintroduced inBanks,
45Ledyard and Porter (1989).
21Graves et al. (1993) have also described LP-based methods to provide price
feedback in a multi-stage combinatorial auction procedure adopted at the Univer-
sity of Chicago Graduate Business School in the 1990’s.
22For instance, Kalagnanam, Bichler, Davenport and Hohner (Chapter 23) and
Caplice and Shefﬁ (Chapter 21) discuss the role of item prices coupled with vol-
ume discounts and complex bid-taker constraints in industrial procurement and
logistics.
23Indeed, the speed of iterative combinatorial auctions has often been cited in
FCC discussions as one potential drawback in comparison with linear price auc-
tions.
24Current allocation-based algorithms cannot scale beyond a handful of bid-
ders and tens of items (Hudson and Sandholm 2004). In comparison, ascending-
price auctions readily scale to problems that push the limit of current winner-
determination technology (Parkes and Ungar 2000a). We are not aware of any
computational studies of price-based direct elicitation methods such as those of
Lahaie and Parkes (2004a).
7 Appendix: LP Theory
Consider the linear program:
max cTx [P]
s.t. Ax ≤ b
x ≥ 0
where A is a m × n integer matrix, x ∈ Rn is a n-vector, and c and b are n− and
m-vectors of integers. Vectors are column-vectors, and notation cT indicates the
transpose of vector c, similarly for matrices. The primal problem [P] is to
compute a feasible solution for x that maximizes the value of the objective
function.
46The dual program is constructed as:
min bTy [D]
s.t. ATy ≥ c
y ≥ 0
where y ∈ Rm is a m-vector. The dual problem is to compute a feasible solution
for y that minimizes the value of the objective function.
Let VLP(x) = cTx, the value of feasible primal solution x, and VDLP(y) = bTy,
the value of feasible dual solution y.
Complementary-slackness conditions express logical relationships between the
values of primal and dual solutions that are necessary and sufﬁcient for optimality.
Deﬁnition 6 (Complementary-Slackness). Complementary-slackness
conditions constrain pairs of primal and dual solutions. Primal CS conditions
state xT(ATy −c) = 0, or in logical form:
xj > 0 ⇒ Ajy = cj (P-CS)
where Aj denotes the jth column of A (written as a row vector to avoid the use of
transpose). Dual CS conditions state yT(Ax − b) = 0, or in logical form:
yj > 0 ⇒ Aix = bi (D-CS)
where Ai denotes the ith row of A.
Theorem 10 (strong-duality). A pair of feasible primal, x, and dual solutions, y,
are primal and dual optimal if and only if they satisfy the
complementary-slackness conditions.
Proof. Primal CS holds iff xT(ATy − c) = 0, and Dual CS holds iff
yT(Ax − b) = 0. Equating, and observing that xTATy = yTAx, we have P-CS
and D-CS iff xTc = yTb, or cTx = bTy. The LHS is the value of the primal,
VLP(x), and the RHS is the value of the dual, VDLP(y). By the strong duality
47theorem, VLP(x) = VDLP(y) is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the
solutions to be optimal. ⊓ ⊔
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53A B AB
Bidder 1 30∗ 0 30
Bidder 2 0 40∗ 40
Bidder 3 0 20 40
Bidder 4 25 0 25
Bidder 5 0 25 25
(a)
minimal information set
v1(A) ≥ v1(B),v1(A) ≥ v1(AB),v1(A) ≥ 25
v2(B) ≥ v2(A),v2(B) ≥ v2(AB),v2(B) ≥ 25
v3(A) ≤ 0,v3(B) ≤ 20,v3(AB) ≤ 40
v4(AB) ≤ 25
v5(AB) ≤ 25
(b)
Figure 2.1: Example 2.2: (a) Bidder valuations, with the efﬁcient allocation
indicated by ∗. (b) Minimal information on bidder valuations to compute the
VCG outcome.
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Figure 2.2: A Primal-Dual Interpretation of an Ascending CA.
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Figure 2.3: Adjusting towards the VCG outcome in price-based iterative CAs.
CE prices lie within the shaded regions.
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